Moral intuitions vary with regard to how much information a salesperson needs to disclose to a potential buyer. Through an analysis of the social role of salesperson and ethical argument, it is established that there is a general obligation to disclose what a buyer would need to make a reasonable judgment about whether to purchase the product. This rule is interpreted and shown to be superior to alternatives when appropriately qualified.

Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is considering, since different starting points will typically produce different assessments of what the evidence is and how it should be weighed. Feldman argues that there cannot be equally reasonable starting points, but his extension of the postulate of (...) completely shared evidence to evidence for starting points involves an illicit assimilation of ordinary cases of evidence assessment to cases in which substantial agreement about background assumptions is lacking. I also clarify why even if Feldman were correct about what epistemic norms require, his conclusion would not show that we should actually suspend judgment about religious or anti-religious truth claims. (shrink)

How can someone confidently believe that God exists, but also have moments of serious doubt about whether the belief is true? A religiously significant belief that God exists is a by-product of adopting a perceptual framing narrative which presupposes God's existence. Using such a narrative is a type of skilled performance that results in an awareness of theistic significance which may at times be disrupted. At such times, doubts may arise about theistic meanings, which can exist in tension with confidence (...) derived from using the theistic narrative as a practical guide. The relevant reflective question for believers with serious doubts is whether some alternative framing narrative is more believable and also capable of engaging them in a way of life. (shrink)

Tom Carson’s recent paper on “Deception and Withholding Information in Sales” contains a critique of my contribution to sales ethics. In this response I outline the approach I develop in two earlier papers and address the four criticisms Carson makes. These criticisms are largely based on a misunderstanding of my position. I suggest that our fundamentally different approaches to applied ethics may lie at the root of Carson’s misunderstanding. Carson uses what I call a theory-application model in which the search (...) for justification interms of fundamental rules is central, while I attempt to contextualize ethical judgments and consider alternative ways of structuring social roles. In contrasting these approaches I raise the question of which way of doing applied ethics is likely to be more fruitful. (shrink)

Religious communities that speak of faith typically affirm the ideal of a highly confident faith. If we understand confidence in terms of the quality of assent to faith-claims, however, it is difficult to reconcile a high degree of confidence with intellectual virtue. As an alternative, I propose to construe confident faith as a kind of trusting perception. The sort of confidence that I envision here makes sense as a religious ideal. In addition it leaves room for the recognition of epistemic (...) risk needed for intellectual humility as well as for the kind of openness to revising the content of faith in the light of relevant evidential considerations that intellectual integrity demands. Furthermore, someone with this type of confidence can find a particular faith compelling, while also acknowledging some faiths that make conflicting claims to be reasonable options. (shrink)

People often speak as if the behaviour of others is relevant to the question of whether they are justified in violating a rule. This paper explores three lines of argument which might be used to justify rule violation on grounds appealing to what others do. The appeal to self‐defence as a justification does not succeed, since it must expand the concept to involve a cumbersome weighing of harms. The argument that complying with a rule may involve too great a sacrifice (...) in some cases needs to be developed by an account of when a sacrifice is morally significant. It is tempting, but problematic, to do this by weighing consequences of individual acts. An alternative approach is to argue that the behaviour of others is sometimes relevant to determining what rule is actually functioning in some context as a part of a particular moral system. (shrink)

When theists and atheists argue about the existence of God, the dispute is most often framed by a shared assumption: that the appropriate way to consider God's existence is to think of it as a hypothesis posited to explain observational data. Theists argue that such a hypothesis provides the best explanation for agreed-upon facts, while atheists argue that no such explanation is needed or that theistic explanation is incoherent. This way of structuring discussion of God's existence interprets the question as (...) a theoretical issue to be decided by considering empirical evidence objectively and dispassionately in order to determine the most reasonable way of accounting for the observational data. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Life‐Orienting Beliefs Belief in God Religious Belief and Its Counterfeits Alternative Stories Orienting Stories and Truth Fallibilism Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Mental Toolkits God as Personal Agent Anthropomorphism Perfect Being Theology Do Words Apply? Alternatives to God as Agent God as Object and Subject Notes.

Although philosophic tradition has often drawn a sharp contrast between philosophy and rhetoric, Philosophical argument exhibits a rhetorical dimension. Attempts to eliminate the rhetorical aspect have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, The nature of philosophy requires the philosopher to seek to transcend particular rhetorical contexts by imagining the possibility of challenging what is not in fact challenged.

This chapter contains sections titled: Examining Presuppositions? Forced Choices Burden of Proof and Default Positions A Misleading Picture Thinking About A Way of Life: A Case Study Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Conflicting Truth Claims Hick's Pluralism Responses to Religious Diversity Openness to Other Traditions Attitudes Toward Those Who Disagree Certainty and Doubt Is God a Hypothesis? The Practice of Belief Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Religious Questions and Metaphysical Questions God of the Philosophers The Kind of Belief that Matters Philosophical Foundations What Metaphysical Reasoning Can Do Belief and Experience Notes.

_Meaning and Mystery_ offers a challenge to the way Philosophy has traditionally approached the issue of belief in God as a theoretical problem, proposing instead a form of reflection more appropriate to the practical nature of the issue. Makes use of abundant illustrative material, from both literature, such as _Les Misérables_, Edwin Abott’s _Flatland_, Yann Martel’s _Life of Pi_ and Leo Tolstoy’s _A Confession_, and popular culture, such as advertisements, the television series _Joan of Arcadia_ and the film _Stranger Than (...) Fiction_ Uses imaginative scenarios to offer explanations of central concepts Incorporates theories on human thought and behavior in exploring the formation of religious belief Written in a style that is accessible to readers with little background knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)

_Meaning and Mystery_ offers a challenge to the way Philosophy has traditionally approached the issue of belief in God as a theoretical problem, proposing instead a form of reflection more appropriate to the practical nature of the issue. Makes use of abundant illustrative material, from both literature, such as _Les Misérables_, Edwin Abott’s _Flatland_, Yann Martel’s _Life of Pi_ and Leo Tolstoy’s _A Confession_, and popular culture, such as advertisements, the television series _Joan of Arcadia_ and the film _Stranger Than (...) Fiction_ Uses imaginative scenarios to offer explanations of central concepts Incorporates theories on human thought and behavior in exploring the formation of religious belief Written in a style that is accessible to readers with little background knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)

_Meaning and Mystery_ offers a challenge to the way Philosophy has traditionally approached the issue of belief in God as a theoretical problem, proposing instead a form of reflection more appropriate to the practical nature of the issue. Makes use of abundant illustrative material, from both literature, such as _Les Misérables_, Edwin Abott’s _Flatland_, Yann Martel’s _Life of Pi_ and Leo Tolstoy’s _A Confession_, and popular culture, such as advertisements, the television series _Joan of Arcadia_ and the film _Stranger Than (...) Fiction_ Uses imaginative scenarios to offer explanations of central concepts Incorporates theories on human thought and behavior in exploring the formation of religious belief Written in a style that is accessible to readers with little background knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Complaining About God God as Micro‐Manager Philosophical Questions and Religious Questions Finding Meaning in Life Is God Needed for Meaning? Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Naturalism, Science, and Scientism The Naturalist Vision The Appeal of a Nonreligious Way of Life Naturalist Values Naturalism and Moral Order The Place of Authoritative Norms Is Naturalism a Faith Position? Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Truth and Receptivity Receptivity and God Overwhelming Evidence Sufficient Evidence Pascal and the Search for God Brainwashing Yourself? The Practice of Atheism Resisting Belief Notes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Theoretical and Practical Points of View Life‐Orienting Stories Stories About God Reflecting on a Theistic Story Attitudes and the Discernment of Meaning Priority of the Story Notes.

Philosophical discussions of the conflict between morality and self-interest typically proceed on the assumption that we have a relatively unproblematic understanding of self-interest. That assumption can be challenged by asking how to relate acts of self-interest and acts of integrity. I argue that when we are talking about motivations, it is better to keep the motivation of self-interest distinct from the motivation of integrity. But the term “self-interest” can also be used to refer to an end, and acts of integrity (...) may sometimes serve the end of self-interest. Against an identity-independent conception of interests (which gives to acts of integrity a possible instrumental value in achieving some interests), I argue in favor of an identity-dependent conception of interests that makes interests relative to the evaluative perspective of someone with a particular identity that acts of integrity help to preserve. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Asking for Reasons Narrative Framing Alternative Narratives Revelation and Reason Mystery Notes.

Henry Sidgwick regarded his failure to reconcile the claims of rational egoism with those of utilitarianism to reveal a fundamental contradiction within practical reason. However, the conflict that concerns him arises only in relation to a particular kind of agent. While Sidgwick construes his version of the problem to be a systematic formulation of a conflict that arises within the practical reasoning of ordinary people, it is actually an example of a worst-case scenario that reflects the common philosophical tendency to (...) deal with issues in their most challenging form. But such a transformation of ordinary conflicts between self-interest and morality into an insoluble philosophical problem obscures the nature of the more typical practical conflict. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Is God Relevant to Determining What is Right or Wrong? Divine Revelation and Morality Submission and Autonomy Fanaticism Rewards and Punishments Morality and Happiness Transformative Ideals An Objection to Religious Motivation Notes.

When questioned about what ought to be done in a particular scenario, students often ignore moral considerations and appeal to what is in an individual’s self-interest. This paper shows how an instructor can use a student’s habitual inclination to think in a self-interested fashion to guide them into thinking about moral considerations. Rather than drawing a sharp distinction between self-interested thinking and moral considerations, a more plausible account contends that self-interested thinking does not function independently of moral considerations. That is, (...) self-interested thinking reveals itself to be incomplete without some normative conception of the self. In addition to arguing and responding to objections to this position, the paper offers pedagogical advice on how instructors can use a student’s thinking about self-interest to guide them into moral thought. (shrink)

Claims that life is God's property or that life is God's gift have been prominent among reasons for rejecting the choice of death as morally legitimate. This essay examines the worth of arguments based upon such claims, considering what assumptions these arguments would require and what implications an approach based on them might have for particular types of cases. The essay concludes with a reflection on the role of significant metaphors in moral judgment.